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Articles
ENGULFED BY THE SPECTRUM: THE IMPACT
OF AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS ON LAW
AND POLICY
Sheryl Dicker and Emily Bennett*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, public service announcements have alerted
the public to a new public health crisis: the growth of Autism Spectrum
Disorders (“ASD”) among children. Many of the announcements use
inflammatory language, such as:
• “The odds of a child being in a Broadway show are 1 in
11,000; the odds of a child being diagnosed with Autism: 1
in 166.”1
• “The odds of a babysitter calling 911: 1 in 1400; the odds of a
child being diagnosed with Autism: 1 in 150.”2
These advertisements are part of a public health strategy to warn parents
and the public about the growing incidence of Autism and to seek
support for finding the cause or cure for this perceived epidemic. In fact,
the most recent estimates from the Center for Disease Control for the
number of children diagnosed with Autism is 1 in 110,3 while the
American Academy of Pediatrics estimates that number closer to 110 in
10,000.4 Additionally, recent government estimates suggest that the
annual cost to society for children and adults with ASDs is between $35
∗
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1
Harley
Graham—Autism
Speaks
Commercial
December
2008,
YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LGCm12S_7ZQ (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
2
Autism Awareness Babysitter, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6cCMR
La25Mw (last visited Feb. 7, 2011).
3
See Autism Spectrum Disorders: Data & Statistics, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (May 13, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/data.html (“It is
estimated that between 1 in 80 and 1 in 240 with an average of 1 in 110 children in the
United States have an ASD.”).
4
Michael D. Kogan et al., Prevalence of Parent-Reported Diagnosis of Autism Spectrum
Disorder Among Children in the US, 2007, 124 PEDIATRICS 1395, 1397 (2009),
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/content/full/124/5/1395.
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and $90 billion.5 Despite all of the warnings and millions of dollars
raised, the cause or cure of Autism has not been found and few
evidence-based effective treatments have been uncovered. In addition to
the public awareness campaigns, the high prevalence of ASD has had an
unrecognized, though profound, impact on public policy and law.
This Article argues that the growing prevalence of ASD is shaping
current law and policy relating to all disabilities and will have a
profound impact on children with disabilities, particularly concerning
special education. Indeed, over the last decade almost 700 federal court
cases have involved Autism and special education. Autism cases and
policy are setting new legal standards and initiating changing
interpretations of the law. Additionally, a large percentage of funds
have been earmarked for intensive—yet often unsupported by
research—services in more restrictive settings. Conflicts among the
federal circuit courts concerning many key special education issues,
however, further complicate this changing area of law.
Part II of this Article provides an introduction to ASD and its
treatment as well as presents the history of special education law in the
United States. In Part III, the Article provides the first survey of ASD
and the law by tracing the evolution of Autism in the courts and
analyzing the major trends that have emerged from thousands of court
cases that involve diagnosis, treatment, placement, and funding of
services, as well as redress from alleged injuries from vaccinations
concerning ASD. In Part IV, the Article charts recent federal and state
legislative enactments relating to ASD, focusing on insurance, the new
federal health care reform legislation,6 funding, education practices,
lifespan services, and new state oversight mechanisms. In essence, ASD
is engulfing the law, policy, and funding of the disability world, though
this impact has yet to be recognized by the broader community.
Although the full effects of this prevalence remain to be seen, this Article
attempts to both bring attention to the extensive impact of ASD cases
and begin to analyze the ramifications of this reality.
II. THE HISTORY OF ASD AND THE LAW
Autism is not a specific disorder but a neurodevelopmental
disability characterized by problems in reciprocal social interaction
INTERAGENCY AUTISM COORDINATING COMM., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
2010 STRATEGIC PLAN FOR AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER RESEARCH 1 (Jan. 2010) [hereinafter
IACC STRATEGIC PLAN], available at http://www.iacc.hhs.gov/strategic-plan/2010/IACC_
2010_Strategic_Plan.pdf.
6
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-108, 124 Stat. 119 (Mar. 23,
2010).
5
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(difficulty in reading social cues, poor peer relations, failure to seek
enjoyment), communication impairments (delay or failure to speak or
conversational difficulties), and often repetitive and restricted patterns of
behavior7 (unusual preoccupations, compulsive behaviors and rituals).8
It varies in its severity from mild to severe but retains those key
characteristics in various forms throughout life. As a result of the range
of impairments, it is referred to as a spectrum disorder: ASD.9 While it
was first observed in the 1940s,10 only the recent prevalence of the
disorder has shined a spotlight on ASD.
Prior to 1975, children with severe disabilities, including children
with ASD, were often excluded by law from attending school.11 Without
an education, many of these children spent their lives in institutions.
After years of vigorous parent advocacy that included a series of
successful class action lawsuits in the early 1970s, Congress passed the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act in 1975 (“EHA”).12 The Act
guaranteed a “free appropriate public education for all handicapped
children” (“FAPE”).13 All children with Autism were covered by the
Act, as were children with any other handicapping conditions.
However, because Autism was a rare, low-incidence disability in 1975, it
was not specifically mentioned as a disability category under the new
law, and children with Autism were categorized instead as “seriously
emotionally disturbed” or as having “childhood psychosis.”14
The Act was amended in 1986 to create two new programs: Early
Intervention for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities (serving children
from birth to age three) and the Pre-School Special Education Program
(for children ages three to five).15 Once again, Autism was not

Comm. on Children with Disabilities, The Pediatrician’s Role in the Diagnosis and
Management of Autistic Spectrum Disorders, 107 PEDIATRICS 5 (2001).
8
Catherine Lord & Somer L. Bishop, Autism Spectrum Disorders: Diagnosis, Prevalence
and Services for Children and Families, 24 SOC. POL’Y REP. 3 (2010).
9
Id.
10
Leo Kanner, Autistic Disturbances of Affective Contact, 2 NERVOUS CHILD 217 (1943).
11
See, e.g., Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875–76 (D.D.C. 1972) (explaining that
the D.C. Board of Education argued that children could not be educated in the public
schools because of their disabilities and that the cost of providing education was
prohibitive).
12
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94–142, 89 Stat. 773
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
13
Id. § 613(a)(2), 89 Stat. at 782.
14
EDITH FAIRMAN COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 77-227 SP, AUTISTIC CHILDREN:
BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE CONCERN 3, 19 (1977).
15
Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-457, 11 Stat.
1145 (1986).
7
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mentioned in the 1986 amendments.16 It remained a low-incidence
disability, with occurrence estimated at 1 in 2500 children.17
It was not until the Act was amended again in 1990 that Autism was
listed as one of the disorders under the definition of the term “children
with disabilities.”18 The amendment also changed the name of the Act to
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”).19 The IDEA
was amended most recently by the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Improvement Act of 2004.20 This amendment specifically
called for developing and improving programs to train special education
teachers on the needs of children with ASDs.21 In 2006, the Department
of Education augmented prior regulations to assist in implementing the
IDEA.22 The regulation defines Autism as follows:
(i) Autism means a developmental disability
significantly
affecting
verbal
and
nonverbal
communication and social interaction, generally evident
before age three, that adversely affects a child's
educational performance. Other characteristics often
associated with autism are engagement in repetitive
activities and stereotyped movements, resistance to
environmental change or change in daily routines, and
unusual responses to sensory experiences.
(ii) Autism does not apply if a child's educational
performance is adversely affected primarily because the
child has an emotional disturbance, as defined in
paragraph (c)(4) of this section.23

Id.
See Autism Decline, AUTISM COACH, http://www.autismcoach.com (follow “Autism
Declines as States Ban Mercury from Vaccines” hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 24, 2010)
(citing David A. Geier & Mark R. Geier, Early Downward Trends in Neurodevelopmental
Disorders Following Removal of Thimerosal-Containing Vaccines, 11 J. AM. PHYSICIANS &
SURGEONS 8, 8 (2006)) (“Between 1989 and 2003, there was an explosion of autism. The
incidence of autism (and other related disorders) went from about 1 in 2,500 children to 1
in every 166.”).
18
Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–476,
§ 101(a)(1), 104 Stat. 1103, 1103.
19
Id. § 901(a)(1), 104 Stat. at 1142.
20
Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482,
9567–9567b (2006)).
21
Id. § 662, 118 Stat. at 2774–75 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1462(b)(2)(G)).
22
Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, 34 C.F.R. § 300
(2006).
23
Id. § 300.8(c)(1)(i)–(ii). It is worth noting that the number of students identified within
the education system does not match the prevalence statistics described above; far fewer
16
17

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss2/1

Dicker and Bennett: Engulfed by the Spectrum: The Impact of Autism Spectrum Disorders

2011]

Engulfed by the Spectrum

419

Finally, in 2006, Congress expanded its Autism focus by enacting the
Combating Autism Act, which provides federal funding to support
Autism research, screening, intervention, and education.24
In light of these statutes and the evolution of the federal
government’s recognition of Autism as a unique disability, this Article
will examine the development of case law interpreting the provisions
described above and applying these statutes to individual cases of ASD.
III. SPECIAL EDUCATION LITIGATION: EXPANSIVE BUT NOT COHESIVE
A. Background: Board of Education v. Rowley
The United States Supreme Court decision in Board of Education v.
Rowley is the touchstone of current case law affecting children with
disabilities and their rights under the EHA, now called the IDEA.25 In
Rowley, the Supreme Court determined what constitutes a “free and
appropriate education” as guaranteed by the IDEA.26 Amy Rowley was
a deaf child who received educational accommodations pursuant to an
Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) during her kindergarten
year.27 These accommodations included an FM hearing aid, sign
language training for several school staff, and communication devices in
the school office for her parents, who were also deaf.28 In preparing the
IEP for Amy’s first grade year, her parents requested a sign language
interpreter for all academic classes, but the school rejected this request as
unnecessary.29 The lower court sided with Amy’s parents because an
interpreter would maximize Amy’s learning potential.30 The Supreme
Court reversed and held that federal law does not require maximization
of a child’s learning potential; schools do not have to bring a student
with disabilities up to the level of her peers or maximize her learning

children are being classified as autistic under the IDEA than what other research would
suggest. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., Children 3 to 21 Years
Old Served in Federally Supported Programs for the Disabled, by Type of Disability: Selected
Years, 1976-77 through 2007–08 (2010), http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=64
(reporting that in 2007–08 school year, the U.S. Department of Education was supporting
296,000 children with Autism, constituting 4.5% of the total student population served
under the IDEA).
24
Pub. L. No. 109-416, 120 Stat. 2821 (2006) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 280i–280i-4, 283j
(2006)).
25
458 U.S. 176 (1982).
26
Id. at 188.
27
Id. at 184.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 184–85.
30
Id. at 185–86.
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potential in order to meet the legal standard.31 Because her current
educational accommodations were “adequate,” additional services were
not necessary.32 This holding is central to all subsequent discussions in
this Article.
B. When is a Child on the Autism Spectrum?
Before Autism Spectrum Disorders were as prevalent as they are
today, children with ASDs were often misdiagnosed and put into other
Incorrect
categories, such as “seriously emotionally disturbed.”33
diagnoses meant that students often did not receive appropriate services.
Today, when determining whether a child is on the autism spectrum,
courts rely exclusively on the IDEA definition of Autism, a definition
that focuses on educational performance.34 They do not place weight on
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (“DSMThis can be confusing since most clinicians
IV”) definition.35
traditionally use the DSM-IV for reference. By contrast, the DSM-IV
provides a more in-depth description of the various behaviors a child
with Autism might exhibit by age three. It does not focus on educational
deficits nor does it exclude children with primary emotional
disturbance.36
Id. at 198.
Id. at 209.
33
Supra text accompanying note 14.
34
See 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(1)(i)–(ii) (2006) (defining autism in terms of educational
performance).
35
See infra note 36 (providing the DSM-IV definition of Autism).
36
The DSM-IV defines Autism as follows:
A. A total of six (or more) items from (1), (2), and (3), with at least two
from (1), and one each from (2) and (3):
(1) qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifested by
at least two of the following:
(a) marked impairment in the use of multiple nonverbal
behaviors such as eye-to-eye gaze, facial expression, body
postures, and gestures to regulate social interaction
(b) failure to develop peer relationships appropriate to
developmental level
(c) a lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment,
interests, or achievements with other people (e.g., by a lack
of showing, bringing, or pointing out objects of interest)
(d) lack of social or emotional reciprocity
(2) qualitative impairments in communication as manifested by at
least one of the following:
(a) delay in, or total lack of, the development of spoken
language (not accompanied by an attempt to compensate
through alternative modes of communication such as
gesture or mime)
31
32

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss2/1

Dicker and Bennett: Engulfed by the Spectrum: The Impact of Autism Spectrum Disorders

2011]

Engulfed by the Spectrum

421

In School District of Wisconsin Dells v. Littlegeorge, a district court
concluded that the hearing officer erred in determining that Autism, as
defined in 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(1)(i), was synonymous with the disorders
included in the definition of Pervasive Developmental Disorder (“PDD”)
in the DSM-IV and, therefore, that a child diagnosed with “Pervasive
Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise Specified” would automatically
exhibit behaviors that would be classified as Autism under the IDEA.37
The court also noted “that the term autism does not apply ‘if a child's
educational performance is adversely affected primarily because the
child has an emotional disturbance, as defined in paragraph (b)(4) of
[§ 300.7].’”38 Thus, when a child’s medical diagnosis suggests that she or
he may have an ASD, but that child is educationally on grade level or the
student has consistently been diagnosed as suffering from an emotional
disturbance, an IEP classification of Autism may not be permissible.
Similarly, a Review Officer in an administrative decision by New
York’s State Review Office (“SRO”) determined that a child met the New
York statutory definition of Autism and was therefore appropriately
classified as autistic despite having been diagnosed by a private
(b) in individuals with adequate speech, marked impairment
in the ability to initiate or sustain a conversation with others
(c) stereotyped and repetitive use of language or
idiosyncratic language
(d) lack of varied, spontaneous make-believe play or social
imitative play appropriate to developmental level
(3) restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behavior,
interests, and activities, as manifested by at least one of the
following:
(a) encompassing preoccupation with one or more
stereotyped and restricted patterns of interest that is
abnormal either in intensity or focus
(b) apparently inflexible adherence to specific, nonfunctional
routines or rituals
(c) stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms (e.g., hand
or finger flapping or twisting, or complex whole-body
movements)
(d) persistent preoccupation with parts of objects
B. Delays or abnormal functioning in at least one of the following
areas, with onset prior to age 3 years: (1) social interaction, (2)
language as used in social communication, or (3) symbolic or
imaginative play.
C. The disturbance is not better accounted for by Rett’s Disorder or
Childhood Disintegrative Disorder.
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 75
(4th ed. 2000).
37
184 F. Supp. 2d 860, 877–78 (W.D. Wis. 2001), aff’d 295 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2002).
38
Id. at 878 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(1)(i) (2001), which became 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.8(c)(1)(i) by 2007).
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psychologist with pervasive developmental disorder “with only Autisticlike features.”39 The Review Officer distinguished between a clinical
diagnosis of Autism and characteristics fitting the educational definition
of Autism, noting that only the latter is relevant for provision of services
under the IDEA.40 Another SRO decision several years later reaffirmed
that the relevant definition for the purposes of classifying a child for
special education services is the statutory definition rather than the
DSM-IV definition.41
In contrast, the hearing officer in Student v. Greenwich Board of
Education cited both the statutory and DSM-IV definitions of Autism in
determining that a child was entitled to a classification of Autism. 42
However, in that case, the school district disputed the child’s
classification as autistic even though the child squarely met the statutory
definition of Autism.43 The hearing officer did not base the child’s
entitlement to services on the DSM-IV definition, but rather used this
definition to lend more strength to his decision to classify the child as
autistic.44 Thus, this decision is consistent with the general rule that
entitlement to IDEA special education services should be based
exclusively on the statutory definition of Autism.
The question of whether ASDs are curable disorders or a
developmental disability is currently debated. Historically, government
agencies have treated ASDs as developmental disorders, implying that
they are lifelong conditions.45 Paradoxically, at least one court has
implied that a diagnosis of ASD is not lifelong, nor does it necessarily
warrant continuous services for a child.46 In Eric H. v. Judson Independent
School District, the court focused only on symptoms the child currently
exhibited, rather than on previously exhibited symptoms; the court ruled
that the school district acted properly by removing a child’s classification
as autistic after a thorough re-evaluation by a qualified examiner showed

N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, SRO 91-28 (Sept. 5, 1991) (emphasis omitted), available at
http://www.sro.nysed.gov/decisionindex/1991/91-028.htm; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R.
& REGS. tit. 8, § 200.1(zz)(1) (2009) (showing that New York’s current statutory definition of
Autism is identical to the federal definition as stated in 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(1)(i)).
40
Supra note 39.
41
N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, SRO 99-3 (Dec. 17, 1999), available at http://www.sro.nysed.
gov/decisionindex/1999/99-003.htm.
42
Conn. Dep’t of Educ., 02-257 (July 24, 2003).
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
See, e.g., Autism Spectrum Disorders, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, http://www.cdc.gov/
ncbddd/autism/index.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2010).
46
Eric H. v. Johnson Indep. Sch. Dist., No. SA-01-CA-0804 NN, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20646, at *29–30 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2002).
39
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that the child no longer had symptoms of Asperger’s Syndrome.47 The
parents did not argue that the child did not exhibit symptoms at that
time; they only argued that the autistic classification should remain in
place because if it were removed and the child’s services were stopped, it
would negatively affect the child’s learning and behavior in the future.48
Thus, according to this particular case, a child cannot be classified as
autistic, and special education and related services cannot be in place,
unless a child is currently exhibiting symptoms that qualify him for an
autistic classification. This holding, however, conflicts with the reality
that while early intervention and various treatment options can have
positive outcomes, Autism is consistently viewed as a lifelong
developmental disability.49
C. What Services Are Required for a Child on the Autism Spectrum?
As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court has determined that in
order to satisfy the requirements of FAPE, the disabled student’s IEP
only has to be reasonably calculated to provide some educational
benefits.50 Further compounding the challenges parents face when
obtaining services for their autistic child, the Supreme Court recently
held in an ASD case that parents seeking relief have the burden of proof
in all cases under the IDEA.51 These decisions are concrete examples of
how the growing prevalence of ASD litigation is shaping all law
concerning disability.
Schools are required to work with parents to prepare or review an
IEP annually for every student with a disability.52 In theory, an IEP
ensures that education strategies are uniquely tailored to the needs of the
In addition to detailing educational services,
particular child.53
strategies, and accommodations, an IEP should identify benchmarks for
tracking progress. Both school officials and parents participate in the IEP
process, and states are required to provide an administrative path for

Id. at *36.
Id. at *8.
49
See, e.g., Understanding and Evaluating Your Options, AUTISM SOC’Y AM. (Jan. 24, 2008),
http://www.autism-society.org/site/PageServer?pagename=life_treat_options (implying
that Autism is a lifelong disability by talking about various lifelong treatments).
50
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982).
51
See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005) (“The burden of proof in an administrative
hearing challenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking relief. In this case,
that party is . . . represented by his parents.”).
52
See 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2006) (describing evaluation requirements and eligibility
determinations for IEPs).
53
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192.
47
48
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parents to challenge any aspect of their child’s educational program or
the IEP.54
Again, in Rowley, the Supreme Court determined that the school
district does not need to maximize a child’s learning.55 Circuit courts
have elaborated and interpreted the Rowley decision, sometimes arriving
at conflicting conclusions.56 For example, the Second Circuit held that an
IEP must provide “more than ‘mere trivial advancement’” for the
student.57 The Tenth Circuit, noting that a FAPE “is hardly selfdefining,” characterized the requirement as simply more than de
minimis.58 Thus, a school is not obligated to provide a student with ASD
with the best program for addressing Autism but rather a program that
is reasonably calculated to help the child achieve some educational
benefit as outlined in Rowley.59 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit recently
concluded—based on post-Rowley amendments to the IDEA—that an
IEP is required “to confer a ‘meaningful educational benefit.’”60
The determination of what services a student is entitled to turns on
whether the IEP is “reasonably calculated to enable [him or her] to
receive educational benefits.”61 Four factors from Cypress-Fairbanks
Independent School District v. Michael F. are particularly helpful in
determining whether the IEP is “reasonably calculated to provide a
meaningful educational benefit under the IDEA.”62 In the sixth grade,
Michael F. was diagnosed with Tourette’s Syndrome, a neurological
impairment with behavioral components sometimes similar to Autism.63
54
See id. at 181–84 (summarizing the statutory requirements related to IEP creation and
implementation as well as the recourse options for dissatisfied parents under 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415 (2006)).
55
Id. at 192; see also supra Part III.A (explicating the circumstances surrounding the case).
56
For more information on circuit differences, see, for example, Lester Aron, Too Much
or Not Enough: How Have the Circuit Courts Defined a Free Appropriate Public Education After
Rowley?, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005). “Specifically, the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits apply the ‘meaningful benefit’ test. The First, Eighth, Tenth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits employ the ‘adequate benefit’ or ‘some benefit’ test. Finally,
the Seventh Circuit appears to use a mixture of the two.” Aron, supra, at 7; see also Philip
T.K. Daniel, “Some Benefit" or "Maximum Benefit": Does the No Child Left Behind Act Render
Greater Education Entitlement to Students with Disabilities, 37 J. L. & EDUC. 347, 357–62 (2008)
(comparing the “meaningful benefit” standard, the “adequate benefit” standard, the
Seventh Circuit’s mixed standards, and the recent decision from the United States
Department of Education Office of Civil Rights).
57
Mrs. B. v. Milford Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 1114, 1121 (2d Cir. 1997).
58
Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P. ex rel. Jeff P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1148 (10th Cir. 2008).
59
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207.
60
N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch. Dist., 541 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2008).
61
Thompson, 540 F.3d at 1148 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii); L.B. ex rel. K.B. v. Nebo
Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966, 978 (10th Cir. 2004)).
62
118 F.3d 245, 253 (5th Cir. 1997).
63
Id. at 248–49.
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His parents and the school committee worked together to construct an
appropriate IEP for Michael, though his parents eventually placed him in
a residential facility due to his violent behaviors.64 This placement lasted
until they could no longer afford the tuition.65 His parents sought
reimbursement of the private tuition and were denied.66 They appealed,
and the court identified the following four factors to evaluate the IEP
that the school district proposed:
(1) the program is individualized on the basis of the
student's assessment and performance; (2) the program
is administered in the least restrictive environment; (3)
the services are provided in a coordinated and
collaborative manner by the key “stakeholders” [which
includes individual teachers, school administrators, and
the child’s counselors]; and (4) positive academic and
non-academic benefits are demonstrated.67
The Rowley definition of FAPE imposes unfortunate limits on what
type of services children with ASDs are guaranteed. In terms of specific
methods of teaching autistic children, there has been much controversy
surrounding whether parents are entitled to an Applied Behavior
Analysis program (“ABA”), which was the first treatment identified by
research as an effective therapeutic strategy for children with Autism.68
However, questions remain regarding its efficacy for all children with
ASD, including the needed intensity of therapy. ABA is premised on the
idea that children with Autism are less likely to develop behaviors based
on observation alone and thus require direct repetitive instruction to
develop certain habits.69 ABA primarily uses clear instructions and
Id. at 249–51.
Id. at 251.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 253; see also Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z. ex rel. Leah Z., 580 F.3d
286, 290–91, 293 (5th Cir. 2009) (applying the Michael F. factors in an appeal by a school
district that had been required by a district court to reimburse the family of a disabled
student for expenses incurred while the student resided in a psychiatric facility).
68
See, e.g., IACC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 23 (“Behavioral Therapies, such as
Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) based therapies, which use the principles of
reinforcement and repetition, have been used since the 1960s and have been studied most
extensively.”).
69
See, e.g., What is Applied Behavior Analysis?, CENTER FOR AUTISM & RELATED DISORDERS,
INC., http://www.centerforautism.com/getting_started/aba.asp (last visited Jan. 22, 2011);
O. Ivar Lovaas, Behavioral Treatment and Normal Educational and Intellectual Functioning in
Young Autistic Children, 55 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 3 (1987); John J. McEachin,
Tristram Smith & O. Ivar Lovaas, Long-Term Outcome for Children With Autism Who Received
Early Intensive Behavioral Treatment, 97 AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 359 (1993).
64
65
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positive reinforcement techniques to teach behaviors that may not
otherwise be learned through observation. It reinforces behaviors to the
point that they are fluent or part of the child’s everyday life. The
regiment requires painstaking repetition and an enormous investment of
time and money. Yet, few other therapies are evidence-based, and the
intensity and duration for ABA remains an issue for research.70
In 2010, the first randomized control study to demonstrate the
effectiveness of a comprehensive behavior development program for
toddlers was conducted.71 The Early Start Denver Model (“ESDM”) is a
comprehensive program using ABA strategies plus social
enhancements.72 The study concluded that the ESDM was more effective
than the programs currently available in the community.73 The
interventions began when the children were under two and a half years
of age.74 The study randomly assigned forty-eight toddlers diagnosed
with ASD into one of two groups: one group received the ESDM
program, delivered by a trained therapist who integrates ABA with
developmental and relationship-based approaches; the other group
received “intervention recommendations and referrals for intervention
from commonly available community providers in the . . . region.”75
Results showed an increase in IQ, language, and adaptive behavior and
improved Autism diagnoses.76 Yet, the issue of intensity—the number of
hours per day and per week—remained untested.77
While the aforementioned study represents recent progress, the case
law has historically focused on ABA. Based on the Rowley definition of
FAPE, however, courts often decide that a child is not necessarily
entitled to an ABA program—even when parents can prove the
effectiveness of this program for their child—if the school provides an
alternative program that gives the child some meaningful benefit.78
70
See generally IACC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 23 (“Of the numerous behavioral
interventions currently in use, little scientific evidence from randomized controlled trials
(RCT) supports their efficacy.”).
71
Geraldine Dawson et al., Randomized, Controlled Trial of an Intervention for Toddlers With
Autism: The Early Start Denver Model, 125 PEDIATRICS e17, e18, e22 (January 2010) (reporting
that the Early Start Denver Model was more effective with toddlers than other
interventions available in the community).
72
Id. at e18.
73
Id. at e22.
74
Id. at e18.
75
Id.
76
Id. at e22.
77
See id. at e18 (indicating that the study was based on twenty hours of therapy per
week, but that the study did not undertake to address variations in frequency or duration
within the program).
78
E.g., J.P. ex rel. Popson v. W. Clark Cmty. Sch., 230 F. Supp. 2d 910, 945–46 (S.D. Ind.
2002).
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In J.P. ex rel. Popson v. West Clark Community Schools, the parents of a
child with Autism disagreed with the school district about how critical
ABA therapy was to the educational services needed for their child.79
J.P. was diagnosed with Autism when he was twenty-six months old.80
At this time, he did not use any words, did not use vocalizations with his
body movements, and was not yet toilet-trained; most significant, at age
two he did not engage in any appropriate play.81 His communication
skills were rated on the level of a four- to eight-month-old and his
receptive communication skills on the level of an eight- to sixteenmonth-old.82 While the district offered ABA therapy, it believed that a
combination of other strategies was appropriate for J.P.83 His parents, on
the other hand, believed that ABA was so far superior to these methods
that the alternative options were not appropriate.84 The court refused to
accept the parents’ argument that ABA should be recognized as the only
acceptable way to teach autistic children.85 Instead, the court noted that
the child’s teachers, as well as outside educational experts, approved the
program the school used to teach students with Autism.86 Therefore, the
court held that the school was not obligated to implement the parents’
desired program.87
Similarly, in a Massachusetts administrative hearing, the hearing
officer concluded that even though there was credible evidence that a
student with Autism benefited tremendously from his home ABA
program, there was also evidence that he was successful with the
school’s program once the ABA stopped.88 Because the student was able
to make meaningful progress without ABA, it was not a denial of a FAPE
to exclude ABA services from the IEP.89 Thus, there is not a set approach
embraced universally by courts. Instead, the test remains whether the
child benefits from the program—not whether it is the best possible
program.
Despite the holdings above that indicate that ABA therapy is not
usually required if districts have another program that will provide
benefits to a child, school districts are not permitted to institute a policy
Id.
Id. at 920.
81
Id. at 921.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 916–17.
84
Id. at 930.
85
Id. at 939.
86
Id. at 917.
87
Id.
88
Middleborough Pub. Sch., Mass. Bureau Special Educ. Appeals, BSEA 03-2915, at 20
(2003).
89
Id. at 23.
79
80
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refusing to provide ABA-type programs to children with ASDs.90 In Deal
ex rel. Deal v Hamilton County Board of Education, Zachary was diagnosed
with Autism by age three.91 In developing his first IEP, the school
district did not include ABA therapy. The district had previously
developed and invested in an alternative approach to teaching students
with Autism and denied the parents’ request for ABA therapy. In
rejecting the district’s determination, the court stated that IEPs should be
based on the specific needs of the child, and that a school district cannot
outright refuse to consider a specific method of treatment.92
[T]he school district may not . . . decide that because it
has spent a lot of money on a program, that program is
always going to be appropriate for educating children
with a specific disability, regardless of any evidence to the
contrary of the individualized needs of a particular child. A
placement decision may only be considered to have been
based on the child’s IEP when the child’s individual
characteristics, including demonstrated response to
particular types of educational programs, are taken into
account.93
Thus, even though schools are not required by the IDEA to
maximize a disabled child’s educational benefit, they must still consider
any and all programs that may help a particular child learn. Schools
cannot reject a program simply because it does not already exist at the
school if it appears that this program will be the one most likely to help
the child achieve educational gains. This highlights a key factor for
parents: school districts are obligated to provide and, if necessary,
develop programs for a child to achieve educational benefits. Simply put,
it is clear that school districts cannot have all-or-nothing policies; they
cannot ban or only use ABA therapy. Rather, school districts are
required to make individualized determinations of appropriate services
for each child.94
The Tenth Circuit recently examined the outcomes that are required
under the IEP. In Thompson, an autistic student made progress in school
but was not able to generalize his skills in daily life.95 The Tenth Circuit
90
See, e.g., Deal ex rel. Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 858 (6th Cir.
2004).
91
Id. at 845.
92
Id. at 845-47.
93
Id. at 859.
94
Id.
95
Thompson R2-J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P. ex rel. Jeff P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1146 (10th Cir. 2008).
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held that generalization of skills across settings is not required by the
IDEA.96 The requirement is only that the student be making some
progress in school; the goal of self-sufficiency is not a guarantee.97 This
case, like many other cases, demonstrates a lack of understanding of the
nature of ASD as a social and behavioral disability; thus, some of the
cases seem paradoxical given the nature of ASDs. Courts have even
imposed limits on what falls within the context of education for IDEA
purposes, which contradicts the nature of challenges faced by students
with ASD.98 For example, the U.S. District Court of New Mexico held
that the IDEA only seeks to provide academic educational services and
rejected social skills programming for a student.99 This focus on
academic education reflects a belief that socializing is a beneficial, but
incidental, by-product of public education; this is in conflict with the
nature of the disability and even with the IDEA definition of Autism.100
The IDEA specifically highlights social deficits as part of ASD.101 It
seems illogical for a court to then hold that the IDEA does not require
addressing these deficits in the IEP.
There are some bright spots however. States, of course, are free to
increase the standards necessary for an IEP to provide a FAPE. In
Burilovich ex rel. Burilovich v. Board of Education, the Sixth Circuit noted
that Michigan’s statute added to the federal FAPE mandates “by
requiring that an IEP be designed to develop the ‘maximum potential’ of
a child,” which would include a child with ASD.102 In determining
whether a particular IEP met this increased standard, the court found
that in a case where there was conflicting testimony as to the best
program for the child, the school’s plan constituted a FAPE if the
teaching method it proposed was appropriate for the child and allowed
him to benefit.103

Id. at 1150.
Id.
98
See, e.g., Lathrop R-II Sch. Dist. v. Gray ex rel. D.G., 611 F.3d 419, 426 (8th Cir. 2010)
(noting that the IDEA does not require an IEP to address behavior issues; a “good faith
effort” is sufficient and all that is required to assist a student in meeting the educational
goals set forth in the student’s IEP).
99
Chavez v. Bd. of Educ., 614 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1223–24 (D.N.M. 2009).
100
See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
101
See supra text accompanying note 23 (quoting 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(1)(i)) (defining
autism under the IDEA).
102
Burilovich ex rel. Burilovich v. Bd. of Educ., 208 F.3d 560, 565 (6th Cir 2000) (citing
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 380.170(a), 380.1711(17)(a), 380.1751(1) (West 1997)).
103
Id. at 572.
96
97
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D. Where Should the Child Be Placed? The “Least Restrictive Environment”
Requirement
As part of a FAPE, the IDEA requires that students with disabilities
be educated in the least restrictive environment (“LRE”).104 Failure to
provide an education in the LRE is a substantive flaw in the IEP.105 This
means that children with disabilities should be in a regular school setting
or as close to a general education setting as possible. For example, the
District Court of Hawaii recently moved a thirteen-year-old autistic child
from a private school, which he had attended for seven years, to a public
school, emphasizing the intent of the IDEA that, to the maximum extent
possible, children should be educated along with students who are not
receiving special education services.106 However, different circuits have
taken varying views on how to implement this requirement.
In Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education, the Fifth Circuit developed a
two-prong test.107 The first prong of the test assesses “whether education
in the regular classroom, with the use of supplemental aids and services,
can be achieved satisfactorily for a given child. If it cannot, [courts
should next ask] whether the school [practices inclusion] to the
maximum extent appropriate.”108 It is only if a school meets these
requirements that it has provided an education in the least restrictive
environment to students with a disability. The Daniel R.R. court
emphasized that the “analysis is an individualized, fact-specific inquiry
that requires [the court] to examine carefully the nature and severity of
the child’s handicapping condition, his needs and abilities, and the
schools’ response to the child’s needs.”109 Both the Second and Third
Circuits have adopted identical tests.110
In Roncker ex. rel. Roncker v. Walter, the Sixth Circuit created an
analysis specifically for when a more restrictive facility should be

20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2006).
E.G. ex rel. A.G. v. City Sch. Dist. of New Rochelle, 606 F. Supp. 2d 384, 390 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
106
Laddie C. ex rel. Joshua C. v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 08-00309 SOM/BMK, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 25618, at *12–13 (D. Haw. March 27, 2009).
107
Daniel R.R. v. State Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1048 (5th Cir. 1989).
108
Id. The court uses the phrase “mainstreamed,” but “inclusion” is the more
appropriate term today.
109
Id.
110
See P. ex rel. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[A]
court should consider, first, ‘whether education in the regular classroom, with the use of
supplemental aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily for a given child,’ and, if not,
then “whether the school has mainstreamed the child to the maximum extent
appropriate.”); Oberti ex rel. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir. 1993)
(adopting the test articulated in Daniel R.R.).
104
105
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considered superior to the general education classroom.111 Under this
test, the initial inquiry is “whether the services which make that
placement superior could be feasibly provided in a non-segregated
setting. If they can, the placement in the segregated school would be
inappropriate under the Act.”112 Ironically, this is a reversal of the tests
used in other cases. The Sixth Circuit prefers framing the issue in this
way because it “accords the proper respect for the strong preference in
favor of mainstreaming while still realizing the possibility that some
handicapped children simply must be educated in segregated
facilities.”113 The Eighth Circuit has adopted an almost identical test.114
It is not hard to project that these rulings could result in more children
with ASD in more restrictive settings, producing fewer opportunities for
interaction with non-disabled peers. Accordingly, several recent news
articles have highlighted the growing number of children in isolated
settings and the high cost of private programs.115
In an administrative decision applying the Roncker analysis, the
hearing officer found that the practice of “‘Reverse’ mainstreaming”—
bringing general education students into the special education classroom
for some period of the day—does not in any way create a less restrictive
environment for the special education students.116 It is only when the

700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).
Id.
113
Id.
114
See Pachl ex rel. Pachl v. Seagren, 453 F.3d 1064, 1067–68 (8th Cir. 2006).
115
See, e.g., Robert Barnes & Daniel de Vise, Court Weighs Funding for Special Education:
Private-School Tuition at Heart of Case, WASHINGTON POST, April 27, 2009, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/26/AR2009042602249.html
(providing examples of the rising costs of tuition for private programs).
In Montgomery County, for example, private tuition expenses have
risen from $21 million in fiscal 2000 to a projected $39 million in fiscal
2010.
The Montgomery school system, which has a more
comprehensive special-education department than many other
systems, has 614 students attending private schools this year. Fairfax
County schools spent $15 million on tuition in the 2007–08 academic
year . . . . The system now has 233 students in private schools. But
others spend much more. Prince George's County schools, with fewer
services, this year spent $56 million on 1,168 students. And the District
[of Columbia], with a historically troubled special-education
department, has 2,300 students receiving private care at a cost of $141
million.
Id. See also Amanda M. Fairbanks, Tug of War over Cost to Educate the Autistic, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 19, 2009, at A28. The Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee estimates the costs
for addressing all of the needs of people with ASD as between $35-90 billion annually.
IACC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 1.
116
Mich. State Office Admin. Hearing & Rules, Dep’t of Educ. v. Allen Park Pub. Sch.,
SHE 06-77, 48 (May 1, 2007).
111
112
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special education students are actually placed in the general education
classroom that the placement can be considered less restrictive.117
In Board of Education v. Ross ex rel. Ross, the Seventh Circuit explicitly
refused “to adopt any sort of multi-factor test for assessing whether a
child may remain in a regular school.”118 Rather, the court held that
it is not enough to show that a student is obtaining some
benefit, no matter how minimal, at the mainstream
school in order to prove that the District's removal of [a
student] violated the “least restrictive environment"
requirement. Instead, giving due deference to the
administrative findings and the conclusions of the
district court, we ask whether the education in the
conventional school was satisfactory and, if not, whether
reasonable measures would have made it so.119
Thus, the inquiry under this analysis is whether the child was
receiving—or could receive with reasonable modifications—a
meaningful education in a general education classroom. Only if the
answer to this is no can the child be placed into a more restrictive
environment.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit employs
a four-factor balancing test to determine whether a
district’s placement offered education in the [least
restrictive environment]: (1) the educational benefits of
placement full-time in a regular class; (2) the
nonacademic benefits of such placement; (3) the effect
the student has on the teacher and other students in the
regular class; and (4) the costs of mainstreaming the
student.120
Applying these factors, the Ninth Circuit found that benefits to be
derived from a mainstream program were minimal and a special
education program would better meet the child’s needs, which overcame
the preference for mainstreaming or inclusion.121 In applying the same

See id.
Bd. of Educ. v. Ross ex rel. Ross, 486 F.3d 267, 277 (7th Cir. 2007).
119
Id.
120
B.S. ex rel. R.S. v. Placentia-Yorba Linda Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F. App’x 397, 399–400
(9th Cir. 2009) (citing Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H. ex rel. Holland, 14
F.3d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1994)).
121
Id.
117
118
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test, the District Court of Nevada minimized the non-academic benefits,
which the student would achieve during other parts of the day, and
upheld the decision to provide math instruction in a special education
classroom.122 The court relied on the lack of meaningful gains the
student previously made in math.123 These conflicts in the circuits
concerning placement have ramifications for all children, not only those
with ASD. Such confusion can have a chilling effect on school district
development of least restrictive settings not only for children with ASD
but also for all children with disabilities.
E. Reimbursement: Who Pays When Schools Do Not Comply with IDEA
Requirements?
Typically, school districts pay for all special education and related
services dictated by an IEP utilizing IDEA and other federal, state, and
local funds. When a school district does not provide adequate services,
parents may find private providers to provide appropriate services.124
The private providers can be very expensive and the questions become:
how do parents pay for private services? If the school district is
responsible, what must parents do in order to obtain reimbursement?
Much of the recent litigation regarding appropriateness of the IEP,
particularly for children with ASD, is focused on reimbursement of costs
for private services.
In School Committee of Burlington v. Department of Education, the
Supreme Court declared that the IDEA authorizes reimbursement of
parents for private special education services.125 Burlington addressed
the education situation of Michael Panico, a student classified as
“handicapped” within the meaning of the IDEA.126 The parents and the
school disagreed over the source of Michael’s disabilities: his parents
believed that his difficulties were neurological while the school system
believed it was an emotional disorder.127 A similar debate often takes
place when determining services for students with ASD. The district
proposed placing Michael in a six-student classroom within the public
school system; his parents rejected this proposal and placed him in a
private, highly specialized school.128 The Supreme Court first noted that
122
Yates ex rel. Yates v. Washoe Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 03:07-CV-00200-LRH-RJJ, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 68937, at *13–16 (D. Nev. Aug. 27, 2008), aff’d 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46970 (D.
Nev. May 20, 2009).
123
Id. at *13.
124
Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985).
125
Id.
126
Id. at 361.
127
Id. at 362.
128
Id.
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a child who meets the criteria of the IDEA is entitled to receive an
appropriate education at public expense.129 The Court then held that the
IDEA authorizes reimbursement of parents for expenditures for private
special education if the court determines that the private placement,
rather than the placement proposed in the IEP, is appropriate.130 Thus,
this decision establishes the right of parents in certain circumstances to
obtain reimbursement of the costs of private special education and
related services.
In Winkelman v. Parma City School District, the United States Supreme
Court determined that the IDEA grants rights to parents as well as
children.131 The Court disagreed “that the sole purpose driving IDEA’s
involvement of parents is to facilitate vindication of a child’s rights.”132
Because parents have their own rights under the IDEA, they are entitled
to bring IDEA claims representing their own rights, rather than those of
their children, without an attorney.133 This case reinforces parents’ rights
to seek reimbursement of the costs of private services.
Reimbursement can be appropriate even when parents move a child
to a private placement without consent from school authorities, though it
is at their own risk. If the court finds that the proposed IEP placement
was appropriate, a district will not have to reimburse the parents.134 This
situation is problematic, however, because it gives an enormous
advantage to wealthy families who can afford to take the risk of paying
for private programs without a guarantee of reimbursement. The
reimbursement cases are another example of how ASD cases have
reshaped case law for all under the IDEA, though it creates a troubling
dilemma. On the one hand, courts do not want to delay students
receiving services—even if private; on the other hand, public school
systems must retain their obligation to develop timely appropriate
services. There is a process that courts should follow to ensure that the
laws do not favor wealthier families. Thus, in a reimbursement suit, the
appropriate inquiry consists of three questions: (1) determining whether
the IEP offered by the school district was appropriate; (2) determining
whether the private placement was appropriate; and (3) determining
whether equitable considerations support reimbursement.135 The Fifth
Circuit recently followed the guidelines of Burlington, reiterating that
Id. at 361.
Id. at 370.
131
Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 527 (2007).
132
Id. at 528–29.
133
Id. at 535.
134
Id. at 531–32; see also Burlington, 471 U.S. 359.
135
See N.R. ex rel. T.R. v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07 Cv. 9648 (BSJ), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27273, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. March 31, 2009) (interpreting Burlington, 471 U.S. 359 (1985)).
129
130
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reimbursement is appropriate upon a finding of a failure to provide a
FAPE available in a timely manner, prior to placement in a private
setting.136 The Second Circuit elaborated on how to determine if the IEP
was appropriate: courts are to (1) examine whether the state has
complied with IDEA procedures in developing the IEP; and (2) consider
whether the IEP is “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
Only if the court finds procedural or
educational benefits.”137
substantive violations of the IDEA should the court evaluate whether the
private placement obtained by the parent is appropriate for the child’s
needs.138
The substantive requirements focus on whether the services
provided or offered to the child comply with the IDEA requirements—
whether the child will receive educational benefit.139 The procedural
requirements, however, are more technical and easier to identify, and
errors are quite common. Procedural requirements ensure that diagnosis
and service determinations are made in a timely fashion with the most
information and participation possible, and they ensure that parents
have clear routes to appeal any service decisions.140 As procedural
requirements serve as a safeguard for parents, a pro-compliance stance is
critical. Courts, however, have taken varying approaches to technical
violations of the IDEA. The Ninth Circuit has held that while technical
violations do not automatically render an IEP invalid, violations “that
result in the loss of educational opportunity” are to be taken seriously
and are a violation of the right to a FAPE.141 Thus, major procedural
violations render an IEP invalid. For example, referring parents to a
private Autism center (even when the parents never obtained services
from that center), rather than actually providing an evaluation, was a
violation that denied the student a FAPE.142 The Sixth Circuit has taken
a similar position, holding that procedural violations of IDEA only
amount to denial of a FAPE where they result in substantive harm.143

Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Michael Z., 580 F.3d 286, 293 (5th Cir. 2009).
T.P. ex rel. S.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 252 (2d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206–07 (1982)).
138
Id.
139
See supra Part III.C (discussing substantive educational benefit requirements).
140
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006) (outlining procedural safeguards under the IDEA); Bd. of
Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 205−07 (1982); N.B. ex rel. C.B. v. Hellgate Elementary Sch.
Dist., 541 F.3d 1202, 1207−08 (9th Cir. 2008).
141
N.B. ex rel. C.B., 541 F.3d at 1207.
142
Id. at 1209.
143
See Knable ex rel. Knable v. Bexley City Sch. Dist., 238 F.3d 755, 765 (6th Cir. 2001)
(“[A] procedural violation of the IDEA is not a per se denial of a FAPE; rather, a school
district’s failure to comply with the procedural requirements of the Act will constitute a
136
137
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Sometimes, however, courts will override more trivial procedural
violations in favor of the school districts. The Ninth Circuit held that
certain procedural violations, such as not including the student’s private
school teacher in the IEP meetings or not incorporating all of the goals
suggested by a private provider, would not undermine the IEP validity
and did not deprive the student of educational opportunities.144 The IEP
was still tailored to meet the student’s unique needs and would provide
some educational benefits.145 Similarly, the Northern District of Illinois
adopted the Sixth Circuit position that technical compliance with all
procedural requirements is not required; so long as parents have not
suffered prejudice, substantial compliance with 20 U.S.C. § 1415 is
sufficient.146 The Second Circuit held that failure to conduct a behavioral
assessment was not enough to find a lack of a FAPE.147
The Tenth Circuit recently adopted the Fourth and Seventh Circuits’
position that a parent not participating meaningfully in the IEP
development process is not a procedural violation of the IDEA that
denies a student an educational opportunity.148 Additionally, the
District Court in Arizona has held that the IDEA does not require an
Autism expert to be part of the IEP team, based on the difficulty of
identifying an Autism expert.149 The court held that the provision of a
general, qualified special education teacher was sufficient.150 The
troubling nature of these cases cannot be underestimated. Such
decisions would have been unheard of a decade ago, but today with the
proliferation of cases, particularly involving ASD, and the recent placing
of the burden of proof on parents,151 some courts are taking a more lax
approach to procedural violations.

denial of a FAPE only if such violation causes substantive harm to the child or his
parents.”).
144
Joshua A. ex rel. Jorge A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., 319 F. App’x 692, 695 (9th Cir.
2009).
145
Id.
146
Richard Paul E. v. Plainfield Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 202, No. 07 C 6911, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29833, at *42–43 (N.D. Ill. April 9, 2009).
147
A.C. ex rel. M.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 553 F.3d 165, 173 (2d Cir. 2009).
148
Systema ex rel. Systema v. Acad. Sch. Dist. No. 20, 538 F.3d 1306, 1314 (10th Cir. 2008).
Courts may be particularly hesitant to find that a procedural violation rises to the level of
denial of a FAPE where parents are uncooperative. See, e.g., C.H. ex rel. Hayes v. Cape
Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 69 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[W]e decline to hold that a school
district is liable for procedural violations that are thrust upon it by uncooperative
parents.”).
149
Parenteau ex rel. C.P. v. Prescott Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 07-8072-PCT-NVW, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104465, at *23–24 (D. Ariz. Dec. 11, 2008).
150
Id.
151
Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51 (2005).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss2/1

Dicker and Bennett: Engulfed by the Spectrum: The Impact of Autism Spectrum Disorders

2011]

Engulfed by the Spectrum

437

After examining substantive and procedural IDEA compliance,
courts examine the private placements that warrant reimbursement.
Once it has been determined that the IEP is insufficient, courts have been
flexible in accepting various placements by parents. Significantly, in
Richardson Independent School District v. Michael Z., the Fifth Circuit held
that reimbursement is not limited to placement by a parent in a purely
private setting; the same standard should apply if the placement chosen
by a parent has both private and public components.152 After evaluating
the IEP under Supreme Court guidelines, the court turned to whether the
private placement was appropriate. Rather than ban placement in any
non-private setting, the court adopted the following test: “In order for a
residential placement to be appropriate under IDEA, the placement must
be 1) essential in order for the disabled child to receive a meaningful
educational benefit, and 2) primarily oriented toward enabling the child
to obtain an education.”153 The District Court for the Central District of
California came to a similar decision in holding that the distinction
between a nonpublic school and nonpublic agency is immaterial to
reimbursement in light of the purposes of the IDEA.154
Finally, in evaluating reimbursement claims, courts emphasize
equitable considerations in determining if the private placement is
appropriate for the child’s needs but note that parents bear the burden of
persuasion.155 Emphasizing equitable considerations from Burlington,
the Southern District of New York addressed a parent’s placement of her
autistic child in the Rebecca School, which can cost over $72,000 per year
in tuition alone.156 The district conceded that the IEP was not
appropriate.157 The court then evaluated equitable considerations,
holding that where parents notify the school district of their
dissatisfaction and do not frustrate the district’s efforts to place the child
in an appropriate setting, equitable considerations allow for
reimbursement.158 The equitable considerations seem to focus a great
deal on the behavior of parents through the IEP conflict. If parents have
152
See 580 F.3d 286, 295−96 (5th Cir. 2009) (awarding reimbursement for fees associated
with the private Texas Neurological Rehabilitation Center where the student attended an
on-site, public charter school).
153
Id. at 299.
154
C.B. ex rel. Baquerizo v. Garden Grove Unified Sch. Dist., 655 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1100
(S.D. Cal. 2009).
155
See, e.g., T.P. ex rel. S.P. v Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 252 (2d Cir.
2009).
156
N.R. ex rel. T.R. v. Dep’t of Educ., No. 07 CV 9648 (BSJ), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27273
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009); Alyssa Katz, The Autism Clause, N.Y. MAGAZINE, Oct. 22, 2006,
http://nymag.com/news/features/23172/.
157
N.R. ex rel. T.R., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27273, at *10.
158
Id. at *17–20.
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participated in the process, rather than making it impossible for the
district to offer appropriate placements, equitable considerations will
tend toward reimbursement; if the parents have refused to participate or
cooperate with the school district, equity tends to disfavor
reimbursement.
F.

Early Intervention Case Law

Early identification of ASDs is critical to the most effective
management of ASDs and optimal outcomes for children. The American
Academy of Pediatrics (”AAP”) recently issued a report recommending
that all pediatricians screen every child in their care for signs of ASD at 9,
18, and either 24 or 36 months.159 The AAP developed a screening and
surveillance algorithm to assist primary care physicians in the
identification process.160 These screenings will facilitate earlier referrals
to the Early Intervention program. Children suspected of having a delay
or being at risk of a delay or developmental disorder such as Autism will
be referred for services.161 Arguably, children diagnosed with ASD by a
pediatrician or other physician should qualify for Early Intervention
services as children with “a diagnosed physical or mental condition that
has a high probability of resulting in developmental delay” under Part C
of the IDEA.162 Otherwise, children will qualify under the broader
standards encompassing children “under 3 years of age who need[] early
intervention services because the individual is experiencing
developmental delays, as measured by appropriate diagnostic
instruments and procedures in 1 or more of the areas of cognitive
development, physical development, communication development,
social or emotional development, and adaptive development.”163
The IDEA makes funds available to states that provide “appropriate
early intervention services . . . to all infants and toddlers with disabilities
in the State and their families.”164 This represents a two generational
service system in that it provides services to both children and their
159
Chris Plauché Johnson, Scott M. Myers & Council on Children with Disabilities,
Identification and Evaluation of Children with Autism Spectrum Disorders, 120 PEDIATRICS 1183,
1195 (2007).
160
Id. The report argues that given the prevalence of ASDs, every pediatrician will
inevitably treat multiple children with ASDs. Id. at 1184. Pediatricians must understand
the clinical signs of early ASD and understand the importance of early diagnosis and
intervention. Id.
161
Id. at 1196.
162
20 U.S.C. § 1432(5)(A)(ii) (2006). See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1431–1445 (2006) (pertaining
to infants and toddlers with disabilities).
163
20 U.S.C. § 1432(5)(A)(i) (statutory numbering omitted).
164
Id. § 1434.
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families.
Typically, after a multidisciplinary evaluation, parents,
evaluators, early intervention officials, and others meet to develop an
Individualized Family Service Plan (“IFSP”).165 The IFSP includes a
current assessment of the child, goals for progress, and implementation
strategies, including delineation of services to the child and the parent
(such as parent training or parent counseling) and the environment in
which the child will receive services.166
Part C of the IDEA requires that a state provide early intervention
services to infants and children with disabilities from birth to age three
in order to receive financial assistance from the federal government.167
After the third birthday, states are required to provide a FAPE to
students with disabilities between the ages of three and twenty-one years
old in order to receive funds under Part B of the IDEA.168
1.

Early Intervention Services

Service requirements for early intervention reflect similar principles
as those applied in Part B (IDEA), IEP cases. In A.G. ex rel. N.G. v.
Frieden, a child was diagnosed with Autism when he was twenty months
old.169 He was initially diagnosed as autistic by both a private
pediatrician and a New York City Early Intervention Program
provider.170 The evaluation provided by the City’s contractor included
psychological, developmental, speech/language, and occupational
therapy evaluations, but did not include service recommendations.171 In
developing the IFSP, the Early Intervention officials proposed twenty
hours of ABA therapy and a variety of other services; the parents wanted
more ABA therapy.172 In determining that the proposed level of ABA
therapy was sufficient, the court reiterated many of the principles from
IEP cases: substantial compliance with procedural requirements is
sufficient and the substantive requirement does not require maximizing
potential or providing the best services.173 Accordingly, the judge noted
that while the parent’s witnesses testified that more than twenty hours of
ABA therapy (the proposed amount) was desirable, none testified that
Id. § 1436(a).
Id. § 1436(d).
167
See generally id. § 1435 (describing requirements of state systems serving infants and
toddlers with disabilities).
168
See supra Part III.C (discussing the range of substantive entitlements under Part B).
169
A.G. ex rel. N.G. v. Frieden, No. 08 Civ. 1576 (LAK), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24887, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2009).
170
Id. at *7–8.
171
Id. at *8.
172
Id. at *12–13.
173
Id. at *18.
165
166
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twenty hours would produce only trivial benefits.174 Indeed, as
previously stated, there is a paucity of research on the intensity of
services.175
In a letter responding to an inquiry on whether parents of a twoyear-old autistic child can insist on an out-of-network placement if they
have demonstrated evidence that ABA has improved their child’s
development and their local Part C provider does not provide ABA
therapy, the United States Department of Education, Office of Special
Education and Rehabilitative Services clarified that the IFSP Team,
which includes the child’s parents, makes an individualized
determination of whether a particular method of providing services is
needed for a child to achieve the outcomes in the child’s IFSP.176
Evidence from the parents alone is insufficient to determine what
method will be most successful to help the child receive the desired
outcome.177 Thus, the inquiry remains individualized. Although a child
is not entitled to ABA services just because those services have proven
effective for the child in the past, the case law still emphasizes that an
absolute bar on a particular therapy violates the IDEA.178 The District
Court of Arizona followed this line of reasoning, holding that the district
was not required to provide a particular type of service so long as it
employed qualified professionals who made IEP decisions based on the
child’s needs.179
As in Part B, there is no set policy on the number of hours of ABA
therapy a child should or can receive, nor is there research on this
important point.180 B.D. v. Debuono, while remanded for fact-finding,
noted that a district’s categorical limit on the number of hours of ABA
therapy a child could receive, even if a de facto practice and not a formal

Id. at *42.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
176
Letter from Patricia J. Guard, Acting Dir., Office of Special Educ. & Rehabilitative
Servs., to [redacted] (Sept. 24, 2007), available at http://www.ideainfanttoddler.org/pdf/
Redacted_9-07.pdf.
177
Id.
178
See, e.g., Deal ex rel. Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 855–60 (6th Cir.
2004).
179
Parenteau ex rel. C.P. v. Prescott Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 07-8072-PCT-NVW, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104465, at *22–25 (D. Ariz. Dec. 11, 2008).
180
See, e.g., IACC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 23–25 (noting that there is little
scientific evidence to support the efficacy of many programs currently in use; the document
notes that ABA and other behavior therapies have been studied most extensively but calls
for effective interventions based on modern research and rigorous studies to evaluate the
effectiveness of many of the treatment options available).
174
175
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regulation, would constitute a violation of the property interest
grounded in the IDEA.181
Parents are entitled to reimbursement when services are reduced or
changed for reasons not related to the child’s needs; parents are not
entitled to reimbursement simply because they believe the student
would benefit from additional or different services. In Adams ex rel.
Adams v. Oregon, parents enrolled their son in Early Intervention
Services.182 The parents eventually challenged whether the services
provided were sufficient under the IDEA. In evaluating the IFSP, the
court cited IEP cases, much like the court in A.G. ex rel. N.G. v. Frieden,
reiterating that an appropriate intervention program does not mean the
absolute best services or potential maximization for the child.183
Rejecting the lower court’s assertion that it is impossible to tell if the IFSP
provided the child with a meaningful benefit because of the
supplemental private services, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the
question is whether the IFSP was appropriately designed and
implemented so as to convey a meaningful benefit—the “reasonably
calculated” standard.184 Thus, the court concluded that the IEP was
appropriate because it was based on careful research and literature.185
2.

Early Intervention Reimbursement

Much like in Part B, reimbursement has become a major issue in Part
C litigation. Case law addressing IEP violations of the IDEA have been
used to evaluate IFSP violation claims. In Frieden, the court evaluated
the IFSP using IEP case law after the parties effectively stipulated to the
applicability.186 Thus, the court conducted the same three-step inquiry
that is used in IEP claims: 1) whether there was procedural compliance
with the IDEA; 2) whether there was substantive compliance with the
IDEA; and 3) whether the private program was appropriate for the
child’s needs.187 Again, only substantial procedural compliance is
required, and there is no requirement that optimal services be provided.
There is no requirement of maximization of a child’s potential.188

B.D. v. DeBuono, 130 F. Supp. 2d 401, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
195 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1999).
183
Id. at 1149.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
No. 08 Civ. 1576 (LAK), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24887, at *16–17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25,
2009).
187
Id. at *17–18.
188
Id. at *18.
181
182
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In evaluating a challenge to the appropriateness of an IFSP, Part B
principles were also applied by the District Court of Maryland in Wagner
v. Short.189 Although Part B focuses on educational benefits and Part C
focuses on enhancing developmental needs, the “basic structure” of the
two programs is very similar.190 In Wagner, a child and his parents filed
suit against the county’s infants and toddlers program for violation of
the IDEA.191 In an administrative hearing, the IFSP was found to be
adequate, and the parents challenged that decision.192 The district court
has broad authority to order compensatory services for past deprivations
resulting from IDEA violations; the IDEA also allows courts to grant
compensatory services to children who are beyond the statutory age.193
This is significant because it prevents cases from being thrown out as
moot where the child is beyond the age of eligibility.194
In Malkentzos v. DeBuono, parents sought early intervention services
for their son, who was diagnosed with ASD when he was approximately
Following several evaluations, it was
eighteen months old. 195
recommended that the child be enrolled in twenty hours of ABA therapy
each week. The service provider to which the family was referred did
not provide ABA therapy, and the child was too young for another statecertified program.196 The director of one of the programs assisted the
family in structuring an in-home ABA therapy program, which included
hiring college students who were not state-certified in ABA.197 After the
child made progress with ABA therapy, the father requested that the
IFSP be modified to provide forty hours of ABA therapy.198 The request
was denied because there was a shortage of providers; the father
continued to employ the college students.199 The IFSP was modified to
Wagner v. Short, 63 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677 (D. Md. 1999).
Id.
191
Id. at 675.
192
Id.
193
Id. at 676–77.
194
This principle has also been applied in Part B cases. See, e.g., Pihl v. Mass. Dep’t of
Educ., 9 F.3d 184, 189 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that the IDEA allows courts to grant
compensatory education services to plaintiffs who establish that they did not receive the
education services to which they were entitled while under the statutory age); Lester H. ex
rel. Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 873 (3d Cir. 1990). Recently, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that financial compensation was not sufficient when a student
passed the age of eligibility but had not received appropriate educational services; the
school district was required to provide all elements of a FAPE, rather than merely financial
compensation. Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 612 F.3d 712, 719–20 (3d Cir. 2010).
195
102 F.3d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1996).
196
Id. at 52.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 52–53.
189
190
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provide eight and a half hours of ABA each week.200 In Malkentzos and a
related case, Still v. DeBuono, the courts held that private providers do
not have to be certified when a parent uses their services because the
IFSP was insufficient due to a provider shortage.201 This lowering of the
standards for qualified professionals is another example of the negative
potential of ASD litigation for all children with disabilities; the windfall
from such decisions has yet to be fully realized.
3.

Transition from Part C to Part B

The transition from Part C to Part B has been an issue of recent
litigation. There is a conflict in the circuits on whether the “stay put”
provision of the IDEA, which entitles students to stay in the prior setting
during any appeal, applies to this transition period.202 This is a critical
issue because it enables the child to receive ongoing services during the
pendency of an appeal.
In M.M. ex rel. A.M. v. New York City Department of Education, the
child began receiving early intervention services around her second
birthday.203 Under her IFSP, she received thirty hours per week of ABA
therapy, parent training, two hours per week of occupational therapy,
five hours per week of speech, and two hours of physical therapy each
week.204 Several months before the child’s third birthday, the New York
Department of Education’s Committee on Pre-School Education was
notified of A.M.’s potential eligibility and the evaluation process
began.205 The mother and the district could not agree on an IEP and the
mother placed the child in a private setting.206 The mother sought a due
process hearing and continuation of the services provided under the
IFSP during the pendency of the due process hearings, but she was
denied. The A.M. court held that the IDEA does not entitle a child to
pendency placement at the level of services received under the IFSP
during a dispute over the transition from Part C to Part B.207 According
to the A.M. court, this pendency right only applies once a child has
previously received services in the public school system.208 This decision
Id. at 53.
Id. at 54; Still v. DeBuono, 101 F.3d 888, 893 (2d Cir. 1996). Malkentos was remanded
on appeal due to standards for granting injunctive relief. 102 F.3d at 54–56.
202
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2006) (“[D]uring the pendency of any proceedings . . . the child
shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the child . . . .”).
203
583 F. Supp. 2d 498, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id. at 501–02.
207
Id. at 510–13.
208
Id. at 512–13.
200
201
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once again underscores the legal ramification for all children with
disabilities from the proliferation of ASD litigation. In contrast, in
Pardini ex rel. Pardini v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit, the Third Circuit,
relying on the provision that the transition be “smooth,”209 held that the
pendency provision applied in due process hearings during transition.210
Pardini shows that well-planned litigation can reap benefits for all
children, while A.M. stands for the unexpected outcomes of ASD
litigation that can affect all children with disabilities.
In D.P. ex rel. E.P v. School Board, much like in A.M., the Eleventh
Circuit rejected Pardini and held that the IDEA does not entitle plaintiffs
to continue receiving services pursuant to their IFSP while the IEP is
finalized.211 In this case, three autistic triplets were denied continuation
of IFSP services until the IEPs were in place.212 Interestingly, the parents
were not without remedy if they could prove that the district failed to
provide a FAPE, entitling them to reimbursement.213 However, the
school district did not have a duty to simply continue IFSP services
before the IEP was in place. Like the A.M. court, the Eleventh Circuit
based its decision on the perceived statutory language, finding that the
stay-put provision does not apply when a child is applying for initial
admission, although virtually all other procedural safeguards from Part
B have been applied over and over by courts.214 The issue of the
applicability of the stay-put provision to Part C is a worthy subject for
the 2011 reauthorization of the IDEA.215
G. Vaccine Litigation
The potential link between early childhood vaccinations and Autism
has been the subject of a large body of litigation and research. Parents’
exclusive recourse if they believe a vaccine caused Autism is to file a
complaint under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (“Vaccine
Act”).216 Over 5,300 cases have been filed alleging that a vaccine caused
209
See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(9) (2006) (discussing the requirement that children in early
intervention programs experience a “smooth and effective transition” to specific preschool
programs).
210
Pardini ex rel. Pardini v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 420 F.3d 181, 185–92 (3d Cir.
2005).
211
483 F.3d 725, 729–30 (11th Cir. 2007).
212
Id. at 727.
213
Id. at 730 n.1.
214
Id. at 729–31; M.M. ex rel. A.M.. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 583 F. Supp. 2d 498, 501
(S.D.N.Y 2008).
215
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446,
118 Stat. 2647 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482; 9567–9567b).
216
Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa). The
vaccine that is most often associated with Autism is the MMR vaccine (Measles, Mumps,
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ASD. This massive body of litigation has been assigned to a Special
Master and has revolved around two issues. Most significantly, is there
a causal connection between vaccination—particularly the measles,
mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine—and Autism? The second issue
raised by these cases concerns the statute of limitations. The federal
vaccine statute requires that the injury be reported or the case filed
within three years from the date of the occurrence of the first
symptom.217 This creates a challenge for families with children with
Autism because ASDs tend to have a slow onset with no definite
appearance of first symptoms.218 Despite all these questions, the vaccine
controversy has used millions of research dollars. It was largely put to
rest in early 2009 when a Special Master ruled that three plaintiff families
with children with ASD failed to prove a link between vaccines and
ASD.219
Additionally, in 2010 the Lancet retracted an oft-cited 1998 paper—
the only research showing a link between vaccines and Autism.220 The
Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee developed a Strategic Plan
for future research relating to Autism. While it calls for continued
cooperation with the National Vaccine Advisory Committee and

and Rubella), which is administered around the age of one and then again before starting
school. See generally Helia Garrido Hull, Induced Autism: The Legal and Ethical Implications of
Inoculating Vaccine Manufacturers from Liability, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (2005) (discussing
compulsory vaccinations, increased prevalence of Autism, and the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program); Katherine Marie Bulfer, Comment, Childhood Vaccinations and
Autism: Does the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act Leave Parents of Children with Autism
Out in the Cold with Nowhere to Go?, 27 CAMPBELL L. REV. 91 (2004) (analyzing the
implications of the National Vaccine Injury Act for parents); Gordon Shemin, Comment,
Mercury Rising: The Omnibus Autism Proceeding and What Families Should Know Before
Rushing Out of Vaccine Court, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 459 (2008) (proposing improvements to the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Act); Bartholomew C. Wacek, Comment, Taking
Sides in the Vaccine/Autism Legal Battle, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 305 (2004) (analyzing
the legal issues in state and federal vaccine litigation).
217
See Bulfer, supra note 216.
218
See IACC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5, at 7.
219
Snyder ex rel. Snyder v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 88 Fed. Cl. 706, 745–46 (Aug.
11, 2009); see also Thomas H. Maugh II & Andrew Zajac, ‘Vaccines Court' Rejects MercuryAutism Link in 3 Test Cases, L.A. TIMES, March 13, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/
mar/13/science/la-sci-autism13-2010mar13.
220
Retraction—Ileal-Lymphoid-Nodular Hyperplasia, Non-specific Colitis, and Pervasive
Developmental Disorder in Children, THE LANCET (Feb. 2, 2010), http://download.
thelancet.com/flatcontentassets/pdfs/S0140673610601754.pdf; see also Scott Hensley,
Lancet Renounces Study Linking Autism and Vaccines, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 2, 2010, 12:25
PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2010/02/lancet_wakefield_Autism_mr_au.html
(announcing the retraction).
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monitoring of potential links, it does not identify a need for more
research on the causal connection between vaccinations and Autism.221
IV. LEGISLATION
A. Federal
1.

Federal Hurdles

As discussed in the introduction, there have been strides in
recognizing Autism in federal laws.222 However, despite these advances,
some laws and regulations potentially pose an obstacle for children with
high functioning Autism. Children with high functioning Autism may
be academically equal or superior to their peers, yet may still have
significant problems with social interaction.223 In 2006, the Department
of Education developed regulations augmenting prior regulations to
assist in implementing the IDEA.224 The regulations define Autism as “a
developmental disability significantly affecting verbal and nonverbal
communication and social interaction, generally evident before age
three, that adversely affects a child’s educational performance.”225 The
regulations further state that if a disabled child needs only related
services but not special education services, she is not considered a child
with a disability, and therefore is not necessarily entitled to free related
services.226 The regulation qualifies this by saying that if the related
services a child needs are considered special education services under
state standards, the child will still be considered a child with a disability
for the purposes of the IDEA.227 Under this federal regulation, unless a
state provides that training in social interaction is a special education
service, rather than a related service, a high-functioning autistic child
may not get the services he or she desperately needs. The Federal No
Child Left Behind Act, with its focus on standardized testing and
alternative testing for students with disabilities, does not accurately

See IACC STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 5 (discussing future research related to Autism
but not mentioning vaccine research); see also Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Court Says Vaccine Not
to Blame for Autism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/
health/13vaccine.html.
222
Supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text.
223
Lord & Bishop, supra note 8, at 4 (“Social impairments are characterized by lack of
social-emotional reciprocity, failure to seek to share enjoyment, poor use of nonverbal
communication, and difficulty in peer relations.”).
224
34 C.F.R. § 300 (2006).
225
Id. § 300.8(c)(1)(i) (2007).
226
Id. § 300.8(a)(2)(i).
227
Id. § 300.8(a)(2)(ii).
221
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measure the progress of students with ASDs, particularly those students
with social deficits.228 Several pieces of legislation that would have been
helpful to individuals with Autism were not passed during the 111th
Congress, and their future remains uncertain.229 The Combating Autism
Act of 2006 provides federal grant money for ASD research and
establishing Centers of Excellence for Autism epidemiology.230
2.

Health Care Reform

The 2010 health care reform legislation signed by President Obama
on March 23, 2010, is of great significance to children and adults with
ASD. Perhaps most importantly, insurance companies will be prohibited
from denying coverage to children with pre-existing conditions such as
ASD. This applies to children immediately and will apply to adults in
2014.231 Eventually, insurance companies will also be prohibited from
charging consumers different prices based on demographic or health
status. The bill’s coverage of behavioral health treatments on the list of
essential benefits is critical to families facing the challenges of a child
with ASD and is a step in the right direction. However, even in 2014, not
all insurance companies will be required to cover the entire list of
essential benefits and existing coverage, including plans offered in the
large group market outside exchanges, and self-insured plans, also
known as ERISA plans, will not be required to provide the essential

228
No Child Left Behind Act, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002). See Shima Kalaei,
Note, Students with Autism Left Behind: No Child Left Behind and the Individuals with
Disabilities Act, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 723, 725 (2008) (stating that autistic children are not
adequately protected by the educational standards imposed by the No Child Left Behind
Act (“NCLB”) because the act allows for alternative assessments for students with
disabilities). The Note argues that these alternative assessments do not accurately portray
students’ progress. Id. at 733–37. Even more troubling, the Note states that focusing on
these inadequate academic assessments especially harms autistic children by taking the
focus away from teaching them the functional, developmental, and social skills they so
desperately need. Although instruction in these important life skills are provided for in the
IEP, they are considered irrelevant for meeting NCLB standards, so teachers end up not
focusing on them. Id. at 738–40. The Note proposes that Congress amend NCLB so
children with Autism can be evaluated based on their proficiency in meeting IEP goals
rather than evaluating these students with meaningless modified assessment techniques.
Id. at 744–47.
229
See, e.g., The Autism Treatment Acceleration Act of 2009, H.R. 2413, 111th Cong.
(2009); S. 819, 111th Cong. (2009) (mandating the establishment of an Autism Care Center
Program); Helping HANDS for Autism Act, H.R. 1707, 111th Cong. (2009); S.B. 706, 111th
Cong. (2009) (focusing on a wide range of services for adults); Combating Autism Act of
2006.
230
42 U.S.C. §§ 280i to 280i-4, 283j (2006).
231
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 [2011], Art. 1

448

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

benefits package.232 Thus, behavioral health treatments such as ABA or
the new ESDM might not be included in some plans. Therefore, the
activities of individual states remain critically important in defining
essential benefits and requiring coverage of a wide range of services for
children and adults with ASDs.
B. State Legislation
States have enacted a number of laws related to children with ASDs.
New York and New Jersey, for example, have enacted statutes to address
systemic issues concerning ASDs. One recently enacted New York law
directs the Commissioner of Health to establish a program for use by
pediatricians for the early screening of children for ASDs.233 The law
provides that these programs must require children to be screened at
regular intervals during their critical developmental stage and that any
child diagnosed with Autism must be referred to appropriate
intervention services.234 The law provides for incorporation of the
guidelines from the AAP.235 A recent New Jersey statute places the
burden of proof and the burden of production in IDEA cases on the
school district, overturning a recent Supreme Court decision.236 Under
Schaffer, states can determine the burden of proof in IDEA cases and can
shift the burden back to school districts, which enhances the rights of
parents.237
1.

Insurance Legislation

A growing number of states have enacted statutes to ensure that
insurance companies cover necessary diagnosis and treatment of ASD.
As of early 2010, approximately twenty-three states had enacted autism
insurance reform laws.238 Insurance companies frequently reject claims
for these treatments by alleging that they are experimental or that the
costs are associated with special education and are therefore not medical

See U.S. House Passes Health Care Reform Bill Containing Provision for Autism Insurance
Reform, AUTISM VOTES, (March 22, 2010), http://www.autismvotes.org/site/apps/nlnet/
content2.aspx?c=frKNI3PCImE&b=3930723&ct=8107177.
233
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2500-j (McKinney Supp. 2010).
234
Id. § 2500-j(1)(a).
235
Id. § 2500-j(1).
236
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:46-1.1 (West Supp. 2010).
237
See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62 (2005) (placing the burden of proof on parents in
IDEA cases).
238
Autism Speaks State Autism Insurance Reform Initiatives, AUTISM VOTES,
http://www.autismvotes.org/site/c.frKNI3PCImE/b.3909861/k.B9DF/State_Initiatives.ht
m (last visited Dec. 23, 2010).
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treatment expenses that should be covered by insurance. New Jersey
recently enacted a law addressing this problem by mandating coverage
of behavioral therapy and other treatments for children with Autism.239
The New Jersey law also explicitly states that services cannot be denied
because the services are educational and not medically restorative, which
is an important issue in insurance law.240
While states are passing such laws, many contain age restrictions or
insurance caps that limit the applicability of these anti-discrimination
insurance laws. All too often adults with ASDs are not covered. It is
interesting to note that while most new state laws cover children, most of
those children would be eligible for services under the IDEA and may
not need as much protection as adults with ASDs.
Thus, the
effectiveness of laws with such limits is still unclear, given the large
group that remains uncovered. New York law directs insurance
companies not to exclude coverage for the diagnosis and treatment of
ASDs.241 A bill passed by committees of the New York State Senate and
Assembly would require all insurance companies to cover evidencebased, clinically proven Autism therapies without any age limitation or
caps.242
Massachusetts,243 New Jersey,244 and Colorado245 have enacted
similar statutes. The Colorado statute includes ABA therapy among the
treatments that must be covered and prohibits denial of coverage under
most conditions.246 Texas requires health insurance plans to cover ASD,
but only from diagnosis to nine years of age.247
Illinois recently amended its insurance statute to require insurance
companies to cover the diagnosis and treatment of Autism for children
twenty-one years of age and younger.248 However, the law limits the
required coverage to $36,000 per year.249 The statute defines ASDs as
“pervasive developmental disorders as defined in the most recent
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6ii (West 2008 & Supp. 2010).
Id. § 17:48-6ii(b).
241
N.Y. INS. LAW § 3216(i)(25) (McKinney Supp. 2010).
242
S.B. 7000B, 2010 (N.Y., 2010). On October 8, 2010, the bill was delivered to the
Governor for his signature. S07000 Actions, NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY (Oct. 17, 2010),
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=S07000%09%09&Summary=Y&Action
s=Y.
243
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47B (West Supp. 2010).
244
N.J. STAT. ANN. 17B:27-46.1v (West 2006).
245
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-16-104.5 (West 2006 & Supp. 2010).
246
Id. § 10-16-104 (1.4)(XII).
247
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. 1355.015 (West 2009 & Supp. 2010).
248
215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/356z.14 (Westlaw through P.A. 96-1485 of the 2010 Reg. Sess.).
249
Id. at 356z.14(b).
239
240
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including autism, Asperger’s disorder, and pervasive developmental
disorder not otherwise specified.”250 Kansas also relies on the DSM-IV to
require coverage under any group insurance policy or contract that
provides medical, surgical, or hospital coverage.251
South Carolina adopted a definition for ASDs identical to that of
Illinois.252 However, its insurance coverage requirements differ from
Illinois’s requirements. To be eligible for insurance coverage, a child
must have been diagnosed with an ASD by age eight.253 Also, the statute
only provides coverage for a child until he or she reaches age sixteen.254
The statute caps coverage at $50,000 and limits eligible treatments to
those prescribed by the treating doctor.255
Maine takes a slightly different approach to defining Autism than
Illinois or South Carolina by defining it as “a developmental disorder
characterized by a lack of responsiveness to other people, gross
impairment in communicative skills and unusual responses to various
aspects of the environment, all usually developing within the first 30
months of age.”256 It then goes on to define an adult with Autism as
someone whose diagnosis falls within the category of Pervasive
Development Disorders under the DSM-IV and who “[h]as been
assessed as having an adaptive behavior score at a level of functional
impairment as determined by the [Department of Health and Human
Services].”257
Connecticut requires insurance coverage for ASD therapies, uses the
DSM-IV definition of Autism, and defines behavioral therapy as “any
interactive behavioral therapies derived from evidence-based research,
including . . . [ABA],”258 but only children under fifteen years of age are
entitled to these therapies and they must be provided by a licensed
provider.259 However, the law allows the insurance company to limit
coverage for behavior therapy to $50,000 for a child less than nine years
of age, $35,000 for a child between nine and thirteen years of age, and
$25,000 for a child between thirteen and fifteen years of age.260 Also, the
statute states that a diagnosis should not be valid for less than twelve
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months, implying that annual evaluation requirements may be
permissible.261
Montana requires that all disability policies, certificates of insurance,
or contracts must provide for coverage of diagnosis and treatment of
ASD for minor children.262 The statute relies on the definitions in the
most recent Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.263
However, the requirement only applies up to eighteen years of age, and
it limits coverage of ABA therapy to $50,000 per year for children less
than eight years of age and $20,000 per year for children between nine
and eighteen years of age.264
New Mexico requires coverage of diagnosis and treatment of ASD
under all group health insurance plans for children nineteen years of age
and younger.265 This bill provides a $36,000 annual maximum but
imposes a $200,000 lifetime maximum.266 The Act also notes that services
that are supposed to be covered under the IDEA may be excluded from
the required coverage.267
Nevada requires certain health care plans and insurance policies to
provide an option of screening, diagnosis, and treatment of ASD for
children under eighteen years of age (or twenty-two years of age if
enrolled in high school).268 This law also provides for licensing of
behavior
analysts
and
certification
of
Autism
behavior
interventionists.269 On the other hand, Louisiana recently amended a
statute to exempt individually underwritten, guaranteed renewable,
limited benefit health insurance policies from the requirement for
coverage of diagnosis and treatment of Autism spectrum disorders for
children under seventeen years of age.270
While the issue of health insurance coverage has attracted the
attention of state legislatures, it is troubling that many of the laws
contain age and monetary limits that deny a guarantee of coverage to
many children and adults when coverage is most needed. Hopefully the
new federal health care reform law will diminish this problem.
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Education Legislation

Some states have tackled the issue of education of children with
ASDs through statute. Delaware recently amended its state law to better
conform to the IDEA.271 Other state laws have tackled more challenging
issues. New Jersey has a law allowing school districts to apply to the
Commissioner to receive additional special education funding beyond
the standard amount if they have “an unusually high rate of lowincidence disabilities, such as autism.272 Illinois requires IEP teams to
consider a number of factors when creating an IEP for a child with an
ASD.273 These factors include the verbal and nonverbal communication
needs of the child, the need to develop social interaction skills, the needs
resulting from the child’s unusual responses to sensory experiences and
resistance to changes in daily routines, and the need for positive
behavioral intervention.274 Michigan has a regulation requiring that
classrooms for students with Autism have no more than five students
and that the teachers in these classrooms have special training in
addressing ASDs.275
Nevada developed a competitive grant fund to be used for training
of school professionals to work with students with ASD, from diagnosis
through intervention.276 Additionally, the Act requires the Department
of Education and the Department of Health and Human Services to
ensure that there are professionals with qualifications to work with
students with ASD.277
Missouri codified the creation of five regional Autism programs
throughout the state; the regional programs are responsible for
coordination of a system of care responsive to the unique needs of the
region and required parental advisory councils.278 Services to be
included in the programs include therapy, respite care, communication
therapies, and advocacy training.279
Texas codified an Autism resource center to be run by the Health
and Human Services Commissioner to coordinate a system of care for
individuals with Autism and other pervasive developmental
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disorders.280 The center is required to provide training to various
professionals who are likely to work with students with ASD.281
Similarly, Alabama created Autism centers to coordinate services
between the government and the school system for individuals with
Autism and their families.282
3.

Workgroups and Taskforces

Many states have demonstrated an interest in studying the
prevalence, impact, early diagnosis, treatment, and education of children
with ASD by establishing formal working groups or taskforces assigned
to prepare reports and recommendations on these very issues. Once
again, ASD has been treated as separate from other disabilities as states
do not often establish separate workgroups for individual disabilities.
This level of legislative attention underscores the enormous impact of the
prevalence of ASDs. Many states have appointed commissions and/or
taskforces to study the state’s current approach to ASDs and to provide
recommendations for improvement.283 While the increased recognition
of the prevalence of Autism is an important step forward, it remains to
be seen how states will react to the recommendations that result from the
various taskforces. Specifically, many of the state-designated groups
discussed do not necessarily have a budget, full-time staff,
implementation powers, or permanence. Each of these factors limits the
power of the groups to create true change.
In addition to appointing taskforces and work groups to report on
services for the needs of individuals with ASDs, some states have
recognized that families need support as well. The Illinois General
Assembly recently directed the Department of Children and Family
Services to develop a support program for families who are struggling to
care for a child with a pervasive developmental disorder.284 Missouri
and Kentucky have both created Applied Behavior Therapy boards,

TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 114.013 (West Supp. 2010).
Id. § 114.013(b)(2).
282
ALA. CODE § 22-57-20 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).
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See, e.g., 2010 ARIZ. SESS. LAWS 206 (creating the Autism Spectrum Disorder Task
Force); ARK. CODE ANN § 10-3-2603 (Supp. 2009); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 13-2801
to 13-2806 (LexisNexis 2009) (creating a Commission on Autism); N.J. STAT. ANN. 30:6D62.4 (West 2009) (directing the Commissioner of Human Services to establish an Asperger’s
Syndrome Pilot Initiative); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-06-32 (Supp. 2009) (creating the Autism
Spectrum Disorder Taskforce).
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which are tasked with reviewing licensing processes for behavior
analysts.285
Perhaps the most effective task force on ASD was not created by the
legislature but by the executive branch. In 2004, the Pennsylvania
Commissioner of Public Welfare convened a broad-based task force
consisting of government officials, parents, consumers, and experts to
study issues relating to ASD.286 This task force produced a report in 2004
recommending the creation of a Bureau of Autism Services. As a result,
the Bureau of Autism Services was founded in 2007 as a branch of the
Office of Developmental Disabilities in the Department of Public
Welfare.287
V. CONCLUSION
The growing prevalence of ASD has triggered enormous advocacy
activity. Individual litigation—not class actions—remains a major
strategy concerning ASD. For example, a quick search on LexisNexis as
of March 2010 reveals 691 federal court cases in the last ten years with
the words “Autism” and “IDEA.” Of those, 507 were in the last five
years and 248 were within the last two years. These numbers represent
only cases in federal courts, and the IDEA requires parents to exhaust
administrative remedies through due process administrative procedures
before proceeding to court. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that
thousands of due process cases involving ASD issues under the IDEA
have been filed in this decade. These numbers are indicative of the sheer
volume of ASD cases litigated, as ASD has become an epidemic that our
country must address. The case law reviewed in this Article reveals the
changes in disability education law and policy resulting from the trend.
Such changes, and their ultimate impact, have thus far gone unnoticed.
The law has been changed for all children with disabilities by this
volume of court decisions in a wide range of areas—parental burden of
proof, pendency during transition from Part C to Part B, the definitions
of “least restrictive environment,” and qualified professionals as well as
requirement for reimbursement. The differences among the federal
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circuit courts on many critical issues are compounding confusion. Most
of these results were created by cases that largely focused on parental
reimbursement—a risk that most parents with children with ASD and
other disabilities cannot take. Those cases created law on ancillary issues
that have ramifications for all children with disabilities. This result cries
out for a more coordinated litigation strategy similar to the efforts to
establish the right to education.288 It would begin with lawyers
communicating about ASD issues and planning and developing targeted
litigation.289
This Article has identified the early impact of ASD litigation on
education and disability law, including the development of standards for
evaluating diagnosis and treatment under the IDEA and increased
attention from both state and federal government. While the true
ramifications will not be known for some time, it is clear that law and
policy must focus on effective, evidence-based interventions and
establishment of appropriate treatment programs for children with
ASDs.
That research must focus on finding effective treatment
modalities including the recommended level of intensity for children
and adults. These suggestions echo the new recommendations of the
federal research advisory body.290
Thus, there needs to be a clear advocacy strategy established for
ASD that plans major litigation as well as state and federal legislation.
This is precisely what happened in the disability rights field prior to the
enactment of the Education for All Handicapped Children’s Act in
l975.291 Without a targeted and planned strategy, states will continue to
create bad law adversely affecting children with ASD and other
disabilities and enact legislation with limited benefit for those children
and adults with ASD. With all the activity generated by Autism
awareness efforts, it is time to channel those effort to go to the next
step—targeted, planned, and cohesive advocacy efforts that include
parents, physicians, attorneys, and other professionals. Only through
such effective advocacy efforts will law and policy reflect the true needs
of children and adults with ASD.
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